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Abstract 
This paper intends to show the importance of having linguistic instruments, principally 
semantic ones, for determining the meaning of words with the greatest precision and, conse-
quently, managing to meticulously establish the different meanings of a dictionary's entry 
words. As an example, a new definition of the Spanish verb mezclar ('to mix') will be pro-
posed. 
 
 
 
 
1 The Negation of Meaning 
Some authors, in the domain of semantics or lexicography, maintain that it is impossible to 
determine lexical meaning and that, as a consequence, the attempt by some researchers to 
establish a relationship between different word meanings and the lexicographic concept of 
"sense" is vain because it is unattainable. This drives them, in general, to renounce the search 
for objective criteria (linguistic tests) for separating sense from subsense and to justify 
intuition in lexicographic work, so in the end, the classification of word usage is arbitrary, and 
becomes a question of personal taste. While some prefer the reduction of the number of 
meanings in dictionaries, others feel a special predilection for increasing them, making subtle 
distinctions according to context.1 Now then, although the result is the same (the rejection of 
the possibility of taking into account different word meanings), their positions do not always 
emerge from the same assumption nor turn out to be constructive to the same extent. In 
general, these positions can be grouped into two large blocks. 
The first, probably the most radical block, considers the lexical meaning to be unique and, 
therefore, only one generic meaning would correspond to each word, and from that meaning, 
a series of uses conventionally established by the speakers would be derived. This is the 
theory advocated, for example, by Trujillo (1988: 77–90), who, after affirming its intuitive-
ness, reasoned that lexicographers and certain semanticists were confusing meaning with use. 
What normally are considered senses or meanings are no more than a part of the uses of one 
invariable meaning. This way the meaning of a word is, rather, a sort of "semantic orien-
tation" that encompasses not only established (both literal and figurative) and unestablished 
(individual literary or scholastic creations) uses existing currently, but also those that can be 
generated in the future. What Trujillo proposes then is a complete meaning that adopts 
                                                 
* This work has been made possible thanks to the research project HUM2006-11883-C04-02 financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. 
1 Kilgarriff (2008: 143), for example, says: "Firstly, any working lexicographer is well aware that, every day, 
they are making decisions on whether to 'lump' or 'split' senses that are inevitably subjective: frequently, the 
alternative decision would have been equally valid." Also Hanks (2008: 127), indicates: "There is no single 
correct answer to such questions. The answer is determined rather by the user's intended application, or is a 
matter of taste. Theoretical semanticists may be more troubled than language users by a desire for clear seman-
tic hierarchies. For such reasons, lexicographers are sometimes classified into 'lumpers' and 'splitters': those 
who prefer – or rather, who are constrained by marketing considerations – to lump uses together in a single 
sense, and those who isolate fine distinctions." 
Linguistik online 42, 2/10 
ISSN 1615-3014 
4 
different contents depending on the context. The word dulce 'sweet', for example, means the 
same thing in the following sentences: 
Juan es muy dulce.  'John is very sweet.' 
El café está muy dulce.  'The coffee is very sweet.' 
Una dulce tarde de melancolía.  'A sweet evening of melancholy.' 
Oyeron unos dulces cañonazos.  'They heard some sweet cannon fire.' 
According to him, this does not imply that the dictionary should not record different uses of 
words; on the contrary, it should record all of them as "particular applications" of the generic 
semantic orientation that unites them. From a practical standpoint, this led him to propose a 
new dictionary model that first gives an "intuitive brush stroke" of the actual meaning of the 
word, in order to then explain, splitting from it, the different established and unestablished 
uses. So, the word sangre 'blood' can be defined, according to Trujillo (1994), as "life essence 
and key to its greatness, strength, vigor, intensity, etc.", accompanied by examples from gene-
ral language and from literary language; then established uses are collected (that, according to 
him, are the traditional senses from the dictionaries):  
1. Se aplica comúnmente al humor que circula por ciertos vasos del cuerpo de los animales 
vertebrados, porque su existencia es esencial para la vida. [...] 2. Se ha hablado de "limpieza 
de sangre" dándole el sentido de "esencia limpia o legítima" en oposición a lo que se suponía 
que era religiosamente espurio. [...]2 4. Linaje o parentesco. [...] 5. Y, de igual manera, se 
refieren al mismo significado las muchas expresiones fijadas, como "arderle a uno la sangre" o 
"tener la sangre fría" [...]. 
'1. Commonly applied to the bodily fluid that circulates through certain vessels of the bodies of 
vertebrate animals, because its existence is essential to life. [...] 2. "purity of blood" has been 
spoken of in the sense of "pure or true essence" as opposed to what was assumed to be 
religiously spurious. [...] 4. Heritage or kinship. [...] 5. And, in the same way, many figures of 
speech refer to the same meaning, like "to make one's blood boil" or "to be cold-blooded" [...].' 
We should break from the idea that a semantic orientation which supposedly explains the 
different uses of the word assumes an abstraction not very different from the one undertaken 
by lexicographers; like these, this kind of semantic orientation splits from the occurrences of a 
corpus, although it deals with a much broader corpus: a corpus that everything fits into, from 
the established uses to the more ephemeral creations. The meaning would be formed by 
common features of all the occurrences, as scarce as these may be.3 This idea, that can seem 
attractive at first glance, poses various problems. 
From a purely synchronic point of view, the case of homonymy shows us the difficulty in 
maintaining only one meaning against all odds, especially in languages in which the etymo-
logies are unknown. In Sm'algyax the sign lbuun, for example, has two interpretations: 'whale' 
and 'quantity', for which, using a strong imagination, it is possible to establish a hypothetical 
semantic relationship, based on the fact that whales are used for food for the Tsimshian 
people. But as such a relationship cannot be tested and speakers do not report any sense that 
the words are related, it is impossible to determine if, in reality, we are faced with only one 
polysemous linguistic sign or with two different ones.4 Even in those languages in which 
word origin is traceable, the peculiarities of certain meanings make the connection seem too 
                                                 
2 Meaning number 3 also lacks in the original text from Trujillo (1994).  
3 Expanding the degree of abstraction to which I am referring, the old Historical Dictionary of the Spanish 
Language (DH), had already created the so-called "semantic branches" to deal with grouping the senses of 
some broad spectrum verbs, like aderezar, into more manageable blocks. See Rafael García Pérez (2003–
2004) on interest in this issue. 
4 I take the example from Stebbins (2004), that translated the term as 'whale' and 'plenty'. 
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subtle and even irrelevant. If the dictionaries are right and at least two "uses" of the Spanish 
noun banco 'bank' coexist in the present-day language, defined as 'seat, with or without a 
back, on which many people can sit' and 'public establishment of credit, set up as a corpo-
ration'5, no one will doubt that two different uses are involved (two antagonistic meanings), 
but it will be more difficult to accept a common semantic orientation even if it exists.6  
From a diachronic point of view, this exercise of looking for a single semantic basis for each 
term distorts the real relationship between form and content and, especially, the process of 
logic that the speakers have followed to formulate word meanings. Do we call "blood" 'the 
bodily fluid that circulates through certain body vessels of vertebrates' because this word truly 
means, ex origine, 'life essence and key to greatness, etc.'? It seems, at least, surprising. This 
reverse vision of the history of words, that Trujillo recognized (1994: 90), ends up being 
forced and carries some excesses that, paradoxically, contradict even the very idea that such a 
"source-meaning" exists. Can a resort to the metaphorical use luna de sangre 'blood moon', in 
a markedly literary text, as in this paragraph from the novel, Hijo del hombre 'Son of Man' by 
Augusto Roa Bastos, be explained in a convincing way thanks to the generic meaning 'life 
essence and the key to its greatness, strength, vigor, intensity, etc.'? Wouldn't it simply be 
more related to the color red, typical of the 'bodily fluid that circulates through vessels in the 
bodies of vertebrates'?  
Lo cierto era que la guerra al fin le había mudado de piel como el verano a las víboras, justo 
cuando la luna de sangre se levantaba cachorra sobre el horizonte del Chaco. 
'The truth was that the war finally had shed his skin like summer to snakes, just when the moon 
of blood was rising "like a young cub" over the horizon of Chaco.' 
On the other hand, one should ask, in that idea of joining "all the uses of one sign" (Trujillo 
1994: 76), whether past uses would have to be included, especially those that have already 
disappeared. Does a unique meaning exist for verbs that have suffered profound semantic 
changes, like aburrir 'bore', that until the fifteenth century, at least, was a synonym of 
aborrecer 'loathe' – so it behaved like a loyal heir of its Latin root abhorrere – and later, 
breaking with its origins, has come to be used with the idea of 'to bother, to tire or make 
tired'7?  
The excessive nature of the proposal is also evident in the impossibility of establishing 
general semantic orientations for certain words of recent creation that still have not aban-
doned the purely referential state and have not evolved in any direction. This is the case with 
the noun ipod, used more and more by some of us in our everyday lives. What would the 
semantic orientation capable of generating its current "use" as 'digital music player with a 
color screen and hard disc' and other supposed "uses", not yet in existence but possible, be? In 
reality, there is no such semantic orientation. The theory of radical monosemy like the one 
proposed by Ramón Trujillo, implicitly comes from an erroneous idea: that words represent a 
hidden, generic, and, above all, invariable meaning.  
The second theory is, perhaps, the least extravagant. It is based on the idea that meaning 
becomes specified by use and that words, therefore, only have meaning in a definite context. 
As in the case of the theory that I have dubbed "radical monosemy," its supporters seem 
obliged to uphold the intuitive nature of meaning that, according to them, as also claimed by 
the previous ones, does not permit delimitation nor description in an objective fashion. Some 
works, like that of Hanks (2008), despite their recentness and more or less flashy titles, 
                                                 
5 Senses 1 and 6 from the DRAE (2001). 
6 In fact, if the connection exists, it has, curiously, a historical explanation. Except for those interested in 
etymology and semantic issues, very few current speakers are conscious of it.  
7 Corominas/Pascual (1980–1991). 
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continue to completely ignore linguistic tests that semanticists have been proposing to try and 
establish more objective criteria for determining meaning (see, for example, Cruse 2004: 103–
120 on this issue8). In that sense, it cannot be said that they constitute a true threat to the 
defenders of the idea that meaning exists and can be described.  
Other authors, on the contrary, have had to bear in mind the difficulty of presuming to defend 
pure intuition while their detractors continued to arm themselves with linguistic arguments. 
Consequently, they have tried to deny the validity of the tests as a preliminary step toward the 
ratification of their position. This is the case, for example, with Kilgarriff (2008), who 
asserted that there is no well-established set of lexical meanings that is appropriate for all 
cases, but instead there are different meanings for different bodies and different objects. The 
critiques of the semantic tests, nevertheless, are not new and, in general, come from misap-
plication or from an abusive generalization of certain restrictions.  
Geeraerts (1993) had already tried to plant seeds of doubt with respect to some of them. His 
examples "to the contrary" tried to demonstrate that the tests could not help us in determining 
meaning, because they often result in contradictions. That is what happens, according to him, 
with the noun olive, when the logic and linguistic tests are applied.9 
1) Daddy, is an olive a fruit? –Well it is and it is not. 
2) An orange is a fruit and so is an olive. 
Upon posing this example, Geeraerts commits a base error, since he confuses the meaning of 
the noun olive with the fact that its concrete reference, an entity of the physical world, belongs 
                                                 
8 As Cruse has stated, there are four direct tests for discreteness and another one for ambiguity, as the readings 
of an indisputably ambiguous word must display another property besides discreteness. The four criteria for 
discreteness we should take into account are the following: a) The identity test, which is based on the so called 
identity constraint. This means that once we have decided on a reading for an ambiguous word, we must stick 
with it, at least with subsequent anaphoric back-references. In the sentence John is wearing a light coat; so is 
Jane, the same reading of light must be selected in each part: either both ladies are wearing "undark" coats, or 
both are wearing "unheavy" coats. This does not happen when we deal with a non ambiguous word, like, for 
example, child in Mary has adopted a child; so has Sue. In this sentence, there is no requirement that the two 
children should be of the same sex. b) Independent truth conditions. Two readings have independent truth 
conditional properties if we can imagine a context in which a yes/no question containing the relevant word can 
be answered truthfully with both yes and no. For instance: Were you wearing a light coat? –Yes I was wearing 
my pale green winter coat/No I was wearing my thick winter coat. Again there are no conceivable 
circumstances in which someone could truthfully answer both yes and no to a question like Is it true that you 
have adopted a child? c) Independent sense relations. Two readings of an ambiguous word have genuinely 
independent sets of sense relations: light has distinct opposites, dark and heavy. d) Autonomy. This refers to 
the possibility of using a word form in one of the senses when the other is explicitly denied or ruled out by 
reason of anomaly, or some such. The word dog has the readings 'canine species' and 'male of canine species'. 
In the sentence I prefer dogs to bitches, the general sense is ruled out on the grounds of semantic anomaly. 
Finally, we must consider the last test, the test for ambiguity. This test is antagonism. A sentence which calls 
for two discrete and antagonistic readings to be activated at the same time will give rise to the phenomenon of 
zeugma or punning, as in John and his driving licence expired last Thursday. 
9 The logic test had been defined by Quine (1960) and is based on the idea that the affirmation and negation of a 
word can only be done if two different meanings are opposed. A sentence like It's a bank (land at river edge) 
but it's not a bank (financial institution) is not semantically unacceptable, but this sentence is: I have an aunt 
(father's sister) but I do not have an aunt (mother's sister). Bank, in English would be a polysemic word, but 
not aunt. The linguistic test the author deals with here is based on the idea that anaphoric structures can only 
reference a meaning that has been used previously with the word in a way that doesn't allow cross-reading, as I 
have summarized in footnote 9. Therefore, in the sentence John went to the bank; so did Bill, the second part is 
interpreted in the same sense as the first. It would be acceptable as John went to the bank (financial 
institution); so did Bill (financial institution), but not as John went to the bank (financial institution); so did 
Bill (land at river edge). Compare with I have an aunt (father's sister); so has Jane (mother's sister), where the 
cross-reading is possible since it does not deal with a polysemic unit. For a complete analysis of the most 
useful tests from the semantic point of view, cf. Cruse (1982 and 2004).  
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to a specific class. If the result is unsatisfactory, it is due to the fact that the tests, applied in 
this way, are not acting semantically (that is, the meaning of the word is not in cause here).  
The attempt to find contexts in which the distinct meanings of words can be interpreted 
jointly (to negate their antagonism precisely) also leads to excesses in the manipulation of the 
tests. Geeraerts deduces in the following example that the tests do not always justify the 
polysemy of the noun bank in English: 
Daddy, what exactly do you call a bank: the place where we moor the boat or the place where I 
bring my savings? –Well, son, the place where we moor the boat is a bank, but so is the place 
where you bring your savings. 
The example breaks the opposition between the supposed meanings of the noun by dealing, in 
the background, with a purely metalinguistic reference. What it is really saying (and this is 
derived from the initial question, that directs the whole meaning of the paragraph) is that the 
lexical form bank designates as much a type of land at the edge of a river as a financial 
institution; that is to say, that as a sign it has two meanings in the abstract, which implies that, 
in the background, these have not been activated.  
More ingenious, though equally unfortunate, is the attempt to create a situation in which, at 
the simultaneous occurrence of the references in one unit, the negation of the noun does not 
assume the obligatory selection of one meaning over another.10 This is the case, in the follow-
ing example when, as the author points out, the financial institution is on the land situated at 
the edge of the river:  
They did not reach the bank in time. 
The abusiveness of these examples only proves the rule. But, if I am interested in highlighting 
them here, it is because it helps us to put forth a fundamental fact for understanding the 
criteria for determining meaning: to be applied effectively the tests require the acceptance of 
some premises. In general, there are some limits, that is to say, certain rather systematic 
restrictions. Deane (1988), for example, has pointed out that comparative contexts distort 
linguistic tests, because it forces the search for elements that permit that comparison and 
considers all the differences irrelevant.11 This alerts us against the use of the test in that 
particular context, but it doesn't invalidate it. If the wheels of a car don't guaranty good 
traction in rainy or snowy weather, they don't stop being useful for that reason in dry weather. 
Reason tells us that knowing all the restrictions and how to get around them avoids, precisely, 
risks of error and allows us to not totally give up the voyage.  
Like Geeraerts, Kilgariff (2008) uses some restrictions, that in many cases he doesn't 
thoroughly examine, in order to attack the suitability of these tests in their totality. The fact 
that some syntax restrictions exist, for example, serves to negate the possibility of deter-
mining objectively if there are two meanings or only one of the verb eat, understood in its 
intransitive or transitive variant. Therefore, the result is an application of the linguistic tests 
that is so exaggerated that it is almost aberrant:  
*Mary ate, and John, the apple. 
Posed in that way, of course, it seems evident that the syntactical differences between the two 
variants prevent all logical construction. Nevertheless, what a normal speaker would have 
constructed, at least in Spanish, would be a sentence like the following, that demonstrates 
that, in spite of syntactical differences, the variants share the same meaning (using the 
Spanish verb beber 'drink' in this case):  
                                                 
10 In this manner one tries to attack the logic test for which an example like They did not reach the bank would 
be true and false at the same time (depending on the meaning that we give the noun).  
11 Think, for example, about Spanish jokes of the type ¿En qué se parece... ? 
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¿Qué está haciendo Juan? –Tiene calor y está bebiendo; María, en la cocina, también: un vaso 
de leche.  
lit.: 'What is John doing? –He's hot so he's drinking; Mary, too, a glass of milk, in the kitchen.' 
As I have pointed out above, the existence of restrictions should make us simply avoid 
inappropriate contexts, not simply reject the validity of the tests. In Spanish, for example, we 
know that the existence of the preposition a before a human direct object can produce inter-
ferences and block the coordination test. This happens if we coordinate a human object and a 
thing with the verb derribar12 'knock down':  
*El viento derribó a Juan y el árbol. 
lit.: 'The wind knocked down John and the tree.' 
However, since we know that the problem is syntax and not semantics, it seems reasonable to 
search for a context in which such interference is not produced, instead of happily announcing 
the idea that, when in doubt about possible meanings connected to human objects and things, 
the tests are inapplicable: 
Aquel viento tan fuerte derribó personas, árboles e incluso tapias. 
lit.: 'That strong wind knocked down people, trees and even walls.' 
Kilgarriff also abuses the aspectual restriction which makes the coordination between two 
distinct uses of a verb when its aspectual interpretations are not identical confusing. To show 
its generic character, he uses an example with two different verbs interpreted as an 
achievement and a state:  
?? I evicted and knew her. 
Again the author rushes to extend the restriction to all variants of linguistic tests and to all 
predicative forms. In fact, a more carefully thought-out application shows us that the tests can 
help us enormously in distinguishing those predicates that present a single meaning and 
permit aspectual modulations in context from those with two meanings that correspond to two 
different aspectual uses simultaneously. In Spanish, for example, a predicate noun like cerco 
'circle' has two aspectual interpretations13: one as action (En un instante, formaron un cerco 
en torno al Rey 'In an instant, they formed a circle around the king' and another as a state 
(César mantuvo el cerco durante tres largos años 'Cesar maintained the circle for three long 
years'). In this case, we find ourselves faced with the same meaning ('position around 
something'), that is contextually modulated thanks to the supporting verbs – formar 'form' 
(action) and mantener 'maintain' (state) – and to the adverbials of time, as it shows the 
possibility that a relative pronoun anaphorically references that meaning even when the 
aspectual differences are explicitly defined:  
Durante quince minutos mantuvieron el cerco que habían formado en torno a ella. 
'For fifteen minutes they maintained the circle that they had formed around her.' 
It is not surprising that for a verb like cercar 'circle', that also has two aspectual interpreta-
tions: action (En un instante, César cercó la ciudad 'In an instant, Cesar circled the city') and 
state (La verja/César cercaba la ciudad 'The gate/Cesar was circling the city' and also La 
verja/César cercó la ciudad durante muchos años 'The gate/Cesar circled the city for many 
years'), the anaphoric reference to the unique meaning by the verb hacer 'do' in spite of the 
aspectual change is acceptable or, at least, not impossible:  
                                                 
12 See García Pérez (2007–2008). 
13 For these questions about aspect, see De Miguel (1999). 
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En un instante, César cercó la ciudad, y lo hizo durante tres largos años, hasta que los 
defensores recibieron el auxilio de sus aliados y rompieron el cerco.14 
'In an instant, Cesar circled the city, and he did it for three long years, until the defenders 
received the help of their allies and broke the circle.' 
These anaphoric references, nevertheless, remain completely blocked when the difference is 
more than purely aspectual. The two interpretations of the Spanish noun experiencia entail a 
change of the meaning that prevents reference to the lexical form if both are activated in the 
same sentence (the variant of the state would carry the idea of 'experience' and that of action, 
the idea of 'experiment'): 
Juan hizo una experiencia con los animales. 
lit. 'John did an experience with animals', (i. e. John did an experiment with animals). 
Juan tiene experiencia con los animales. 
lit. 'John has experience with animals', (i. e. John has some experience with animals). 
*Juan tuvo la experiencia que había hecho con los animals. 
lit. 'John had the experience that he had done with the animals'. 
*Juan hizo la experiencia que había tenido con los animales. 
lit. 'John did the experience that he had had with the animals'; etc.  
From a verbal perspective, compare the Spanish verb cercar 'circle' with the Spanish verb 
amar 'love', that has a stative interpretation ('have love') and another of action ('to perform a 
sexual act') which are contradictory in speech; that is to say, it deals with real differences in 
meaning, not simply contextual modulations.  
???? En aquel momento, Juan y María se amaron [to perform a sexual act]15 como locos en el 
piso del corredor. Lo hicieron [idea of 'have love'] durante muchos años, hasta que un día se 
sintieron lejos el uno del otro. 
As we see here, as opposed to what happened above, where the anaphoric reference of cerco 
'circle' with the verb hacer 'do' allows a cross-reading of the proposed meanings 'to go around 
something' and 'to surround something', in this last example a cross-reading is impossible.  
To finish with respect to the linguistic tests, it is worth pointing out that Kilgarriff's last 
charge against them suffers from the same problems of the previous ones, although it ends up 
being less interesting for its rather arbitrary generalizations. This author maintains that the 
linguistic tests do not provide stable results, since many speakers can have divergent opinions 
with respect to their relevance. What is certain is that the existence of words for which the 
                                                 
14 On the Internet, mainly in specific blogs, that are a source of living language, I find quite a few examples. The 
following phrases present two aspectual variants of the verb desaparacer: Terminó la canción y Kotipelto dio 
las gracias al público, recibiendo una ovación con gritos a coro de "¡Kotipelto, Kotipelto!" De repente... 
¿Dónde está el jefe Tolkki? Había desaparecido de escena, y lo hizo durante unos tres minutos; lit. 'The song 
ended and Kotipelto thanked the audience, receiving an ovation with shouts in chorus of "Kotipelto, 
Kotipelto!" Suddenly [...] Where is Chief Tolkki? He had disappeared from the scene, and he did it for three 
minutes' (http://www.rafabasa.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=1359). This other one, taken 
from the digital press, turns out to be of special interest: Los comisarios ondearon la bandera roja indicando 
que la sesión se paraba, y lo hizo durante 17 minutos; lit. 'The officials waved the red flag indicating that the 
session was over, and it did it for 17 minutes' (http://www.hoy.es/prensa/20070610/deportes/optimista-cara-
lograr-victoria_20070610.html). The purely aspectual nature of the difference allows for even more extreme 
cases, like the anaphoric reference of the meaning of the predicate structure en pie (stand up): El animal, 
agonizando, intentó ponerse en pie. Y lo hizo durante unos instantes; lit. 'The animal, agonizing, tried to stand 
up. And he did it for some moments' (http://www.geocities.com/gazapon/pages/pedro.htm). That it involves 
mostly informal or colloquial texts doesn't change anything: the interesting thing is confirming that for the 
speakers the aspectual differences are not on the same level as the semantic differences.  
15 In the examples that illustrate the application of the tests, I use brackets to make the semantic interpretations 
clear. 
Linguistik online 42, 2/10 
ISSN 1615-3014 
10 
informants show a very high degree of agreement, separating some supposed meanings, while 
uniting others, seems to be enough to question this statement unequivocally. Naturally, I 
would be the last to say that there are no difficulties when trying to discern between polysemy 
and monosemy: if there are it's because the lexicon is not a bipolar reality. Cruse (2004: 112–
118) has already shown how between these two concepts, in the strictest sense, an inter-
mediate series of cases occur that should be taken into account. The discovery of these cases 
is not, therefore, necessarily a negative fact. Thanks to the distinct degrees to which the 
linguistic tests can diverge when applied to certain problematic words, it has been possible to 
make a semantic classification with important reercussions, we hope, for lexicography.  
At this point it seems clear that the theory of the intuitive nature of semantic description does 
not hold up. If linguistics provides us with the keys for discovering lexical meaning, this is 
not, after all, as dependent on lexicographic objectives nor on the corpus as the defenders of 
the "the meaning is the use" theory believe. From this perspective, it remains perfectly clear 
that the supposed meaning 'handbag as weapon' of the noun (handbag), to which Kilgarriff 
refers in his article (for criticizing the habitual decision of lexicographers to exclude it from 
dictionaries), is not autonomous, even when it forms part of the connotations of the general 
meaning of the word. It seems logical, contrarily to what he implies, that it is not entered as a 
meaning in a dictionary. To the contrary, handbag as the name of a new type of music – 
especially from the moment it acquires a significant degree of lexicalization – constitutes a 
new meaning (as the linguistic tests demonstrate, which I don't think it is necessary to apply 
here), that is independent of what a lexicographer decides to include or not include for 
editorial reasons, space, profile of the potential user of the work, etc., in a new dictionary. In 
that sense, it's best to not confuse semantics with specific lexicographic decisions.  
 
2 Meaning Distinction: Lexicographic Application 
If lexical semantics helps us to distinguish meanings, as I will have the opportunity to prove 
shortly, that is due to the speakers of the language. Although they are not always conscious of 
it to the same extent, they have integrated them in their mental lexicon and, in one way or 
another, end up showing it in the relationships that they establish with words.16 But, in order 
for the speakers to integrate these prototypical meanings – together with the rules that permit 
the creation of other new ones, more related to context and, therefore, not always expected – 
these meanings must satisfy at least three conditions: a) be autonomous; b) be antagonistic 
and c) be truly established17. The combination of the three – and only the three jointly – will 
allow us to decide that the Spanish noun banco, for example, has two meanings, 'seat' and 
'financial institution', but not pizza, at least in b) in the following cases18, where the word is 
used with a meaning other than its default reading (Cruse 2004: 106):  
a) Juan comió una pizza. 
 'John ate the pizza.' 
b) La pizza se ha ido sin pagar (entre camareros, en un restaurante). 
 'The pizza has left without paying (between waiters in a restaurant).' 
Precisely, the semantic tests try to determine when these three requirements are met and when 
they are not. Therefore, they take into account the normal and anomalous relationships, that 
                                                 
16 Cruse (1986: 16). 
17 Cruse (2004: 104–112). In Croft/Cruse (2004: 109) the possibility of separating the different meanings of a 
word is also defended, but from a new semantic perspective: the so-called "dynamic construction of meaning" 
that implies accepting some premises, like the fact that those meanings are not considered a property of the 
lexical signs so much as an object of a definite construction in speech.  
18 Naturally, the first two are satisfied, but not the third. The idea of "establishment" is fundamental for Lexico-
graphy. 
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can be established among words. As already shown above, these tests are not as confusing as 
some think, and it has also been mentioned that, thanks to them, we can distinguish with a 
high degree of reliability what the speakers have been storing, often without being conscious 
of it, in their mental lexicon.  
In this sense, the application of the semantic tests to lexicography becomes fundamental for 
stopping incoherences19 in the presentation of meanings, as much from an internal point of 
view (words that are found in identical situations) as external (the same word in distinct 
dictionaries). Next, then, I will try to show how we can make use of them for establishing, in 
a more objective and reliable way, senses and subsenses in dictionary entries20. I will 
especially focus on verbs, one of the most complex grammatical categories, and, therefore, 
I'm using the Spanish verb mezclar 'mix' as a model.  
 
2.1 Mezclar in some Spanish dictionaries 
For this study I have selected three dictionaries that are very similar with respect to size and 
objectives: The Diccionario Salamanca de la lengua española (DiSal); The Diccionario 
esencial Santillana de la lengua española (DES) and The Diccionario de la lengua española 
(secundaria) (DLES)21. 
The first defines mezclar in the following way: 
mezclar v. tr. 1 Juntar <una persona> [varias cosas] para que sus partes queden unas entre otras: 
No mezcles el vino, que se estropea. 2 Revolver <una persona> [cosas que estaban ordenadas]: 
No mezcles las fichas porque están por orden alfabético. // v. tr. prnl. 3 Juntar <una persona> 
[personas o cosas] de forma que no puedan distinguirse unas de otras: En el recreo se mezclan 
los alumnos de varios cursos. // 4 Comprometer <una persona> [a otra persona] en [un asunto]: 
Me mezclé en su negocio al principio, pero no sabía que era ilegal. // v. prnl. 5 Relacionarse 
<una persona> con [determinadas personas]: Es peligroso mezclarse con tipos como esos. 
6 Juntarse <personas o cosas> de forma que no puedan distinguirse entre [otras personas o 
cosas]: Nos mezclamos con la muchedumbre en la manifestación. Se han caído y se han 
mezclado todos los sellos. 7 Enlazarse <familias o linajes> unos con otros: Los aristócratas no 
se mezclan con cualquiera. FR. Y LOC. – churras con merinas.  
The Diccionario esencial Santillana does it like this: 
mezclar (del lat.vulg, misculare, y éste del lat. miscere) v tr. 1. Juntar varias cosas para que sus 
partes queden unas entre otras. También v. prnl. 2. Juntar, confundir: mezclar intereses. 
También v. prnl: En el recreo se mezclan los alumnos de varios cursos. 3. Desordenar lo que 
estaba ordenado: Ha mezclado los libros de la estantería y ahora no se puede encontrar 
ninguno. 4. Meter a alguien en algún asunto que no le importa o que puede traerle malas 
consecuencias: Deseo que no me mezcléis en vuestra discusión. También v. prnl. // mezclarse v 
prnl. 5. Relacionarse con determinada clase de gente: Le gusta mezclarse con los artistas. 6. 
Confundirse entre la gente: Se mezcló con la muchedumbre en la manifestación. 7. Referido a 
familias o linajes, enlazarse unos con otros. SIN. 1. Combinar. 1. y 2. Entremezclar. 
3. Embarullar, liar. 4. Involucrar(se). ANT. 1. y 2. Separar(se), desunir(se). FAM. Mezcla, 
mezclamente, mezclador, mezcolanza / Entremezclar, mescolanza, miscible, mixto. 
                                                 
19 Coherence has already been referred to, a while ago, as the beginning minimum rule of lexicography. Pascual 
(1996).  
20 These issues, although applied to a historical dictionary, have also been dealt with by García Pérez (2007a, 
2007–2008 and in press). 
21 All are scholastic dictionaries or, at least, are geared toward junior high school students or students of Spanish 
as a foreign language. 
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On its behalf, the Diccionario de la lengua española (secundaria) Vox, offers us the following 
definitions:  
mezclar v tr. / prnl. 1 Juntar o unir varias cosas distintas para que formen un todo: bata los 
huevos y mézclelos con la harina; el bodeguero mezclaba vino y agua; el pintor no ha mezclado 
bien los colores. 2 Alterar mediante su manipulación el orden de algo que estaba ordenado: deja 
de tocar mis papeles, los estás mezclando; no me mezcles las fotos. 3 Juntar o reunir personas o 
cosas distintas: en su fiesta mezcló a intelectuales y artistas. 4 En cinematografía, unir varias 
imágenes, sonidos y música: en el laboratorio se mezclan los fotogramas de la película con los 
efectos especiales. 5 Meter a una persona en un asunto que no le incumbe o que puede traerle 
problemas: mezcló a su familia en sus negocios sucios y ahora están todos en la cárcel; no te 
mezcles en este asunto si quieres evitarte problemas. SIN. involucrar. // v. pronl. 6 mezclarse 
Introducirse o meterse entre la gente: el cantante se mezcló entre el público para pasar 
desapercibido. 7 Tener relación o trato: sus padres le prohibieron mezclarse con los otros chicos 
del barrio. 
DER mezcla, entremezclar. 
ETIM. Mezclar procede del latín miscere, que tenía el mismo significado, voz con la que 
también está relacionada promiscuo. 
Our first impression of this is, without a doubt, surprise. How is it possible that the same word 
can be defined in ways so different depending on the dictionary that assigns it? We have 
already seen that the answer is simple, though not glorious: the lexicographers act according 
to their personal intuition. But the intuition gets carried away with aspects that do not always 
have anything to do with the real meaning of the words. One of them (García 2007b) is the 
influence of the purely contextual. That is the way, for example, the DiSal separates meanings 
1 and 2 because, for the lexicographer, the fact that a physical object is organized according to 
a predetermined order (like reference cards, photos, letters, etc.) or has a more chaotic 
distribution (particles of wine) is enough to alter the meaning of the verb that selects the 
corresponding nouns. But curiously, for speakers, an accessory element is involved, since 
they could coordinate the two types of nouns without any problem, and make one cross-
reading for the two supposed meanings:  
1) ¡Este chico! Primero mezcló el vino de las dos botellas que nos regalaron; ahora, las 
 fotos de nuestra boda. ¿Te parece normal? 
 'This boy! First he mixed the wine from the two bottles that they gave us; now, the photos 
 of our wedding. Does that seem normal to you?' 
It's evident that in the mind of the lexicographer the grammatical difference between conti-
nuous and discontinuous nouns was also present. Specifically, grammar is a mechanism that 
is used a lot in the separation of meanings, but can turn out to be enormously tricky. 
Meanings 2 and 3 of the DLES are differentiated by the presence or absence of the 
preposition and multiple objects. An example like El profesor mezcló a los alumnos 'The 
teacher mixed the pupils'22 can be coordinated as much with the examples from supposed 
meaning 2 as from 3, but for the differentiation we stop interpreting the sentence in the same 
way, which demonstrates that there is no antagonism between them: 
2) Juan mezcló a los alumnos y alumnas de su grupo; en la fiesta, a intelectuales y artistas. 
 'John mixed up the male and female pupils from his group, and at the party, intellectuals 
 and artists.' 
3) No mezcles las fotos. –Tampoco tú a los alumnos. 
 'Don't mix the photos. –The pupils neither.' 
                                                 
22 As I have demonstrated in XXX, El profesor mezcló a los alumnos y Los alumnos se mezclaron form part of 
the same meaning. I will not detail, then, this issue in this work. 
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 It is also understood, then, that meanings 2 and 3 of the DiSal and the DES are, in reality, the 
same. However, upon seeing the definitions and corresponding examples of meanings 1 and 2 
of the DLES, one should ask if we can interpret that there are two distinct meanings taking 
into account the idea that things that are joined can or cannot form a homogeneous whole.23 
The response is negative, as deduced from the absence of zeugma in a sentence like 4 or from 
the possibility of creating cross-readings with the two supposed meanings in 5 and 6. Both 
meanings, then, would not be antagonistic: 
4) Juan mezcló el vino; Pedro, el agua con el aceite; María, los manuales y las enciclopedi-
 as; Luisa, los papeles de su madre. 
 'John mixed the wine; Peter, the water with the oil; Maria, manuals and encyclopedias; 
 Louisa, her mother's papers.' 
5) Si quieres, yo mezclo los colores en la paleta; tú, las naranjas y las manzanas en el 
 frutero. Así empezaré antes el bodegón. 
 'If you want, I'll mix the colors on the pallet; you, the oranges and apples in the fruit 
 bowl. That's how I will start painting the still-life sooner.' 
6) ¿Te sientes mal? Es por haber mezclado la cerveza con esa gaseosa tan mala o el vino 
 con el champán? 
 'Do you feel bad? Is it for having mixed the beer with that really bad soda or the wine 
 with the champagne?' 
Meaning 6 from the three dictionaries splits from a pronominal use that is not such;24 in 
reality, it could involve a pronominal agentive variant of the basic transitive form of the 
Spanish verb mezclar, that can also select the prepositions con 'with' and entre 'in with' + 
plural or collective human object, although the first is, without a doubt, more frequent. Thus it 
can be noted, for example, in the following sentences25:  
7) Por la noche los mezclaron con otros rehenes en la cuadra de la Capaniera ( Estas 
 personas se mezclaron con otros rehenes en la cuadra de la Capaniera).  
 'During the night they mixed them with other hostages in the stable of the Capaniera 
 ( These people were mixed with other hostages in the stable of the Capaniera).' 
8) Son gente especial, de otra pasta. Creo que unos extratarrestes llegaron, y los mezclaron 
 entre nosotros como experimento ( Estas personas se mezclaron entre nosotros como 
 experimento).  
 'They are special people, cut from a different cloth. I think some extraterrestrials arrived 
 and mixed them in with us as an experiment. ( These people were mixed in with us as  an 
 experiment).' 
The idea of being in a group of people does not change the meaning of the verb. If we study 
the issue a little deeper, we realize that, despite the examples from the dictionary, the Spanish 
preposition entre ('in with') is not only used with plural or collective human objects, but also a 
broader group of things in the plural form or of collective nouns. Nor is it necessary, on the 
other hand, for an agentive subject to be present (Juan mezcló las fotos entre los papeles  
Las fotos se mezclaron entre los papeles o Juan mezcló la foto entre los papeles  La foto se 
mezcló entre los papeles; 'John mixed the photos in with the papers'  'The photos were 
                                                 
23 With an express definition in this sense, is the solution arrived at by, for example, the Diccionario del estu-
diante. See Real Academia Española (2005).  
24 In the case of DiSal the second example of this meaning makes the separation with respect to number 2 in-
comprehensible.  
25 The two sentences are real. The first comes from the web page www.mamamargarita2006.com/Comini and 
the second from the blog www.fotolog.com/eis_eis_baby/33805238. The transformations in parenthesis are 
mine. 
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mixed in with the papers or John mixed the photo in with the papers'  'The photo was mixed 
in with the papers'). In that sense, it appears logical, that there are no problems of 
coordination between the previous supposed meanings and this last one: 
9) Las fotos se mezclaron entre los papeles; tus monedas, entre la ropa. 
 'The photos were mixed in with the papers; your coins, in with the clothes.' 
10) Las monedas rodaron y se mezclaron entre los juguetes; mis hijos, entre los invitados.26  
 'The coins rolled and mixed in with the toys; my children, with the guests.' 
The equivalence between the prepositions con ('with') and entre27 (in with) can be noted in the 
sentences 11 and 12. In the first, both are interchangeable without changing the orientation of 
the verb; in the second, it is confirmed that one preposition cannot be rejected and the other 
affirmed, because there is no semantic difference that justifies such an operation: 
11) Los alumnos de primero se mezclaron entre el gentío, no con los manifestantes.  
 'The first grade students mixed in with the crowd, and not with the demonstrators.' 
12) ¿Se mezcló Juan con la muchedumbre? 
 a) Sí, se mezcló con la muchedumbre. 
 b) *No, se mezcló entre la muchedumbre. 
 'Did John mix with the crowd?' 
 a) 'Yes, he mixed with the crowd.' 
 b) 'No, he mixed in with the crowd.' 
The example of supposed meaning 4 of the DLES is very poorly selected, since with that 
composition it is no more than a variant of the basic meaning: 
13) Juan mezcló el vino con el agua; Pedro, los fotogramas de la película con los efectos 
 especiales.  
 'John mixed the wine with the water; Peter, the film clips with the special effects.' 
The meaning of 'to have a relationship or dealings with someone', with which the three works 
are in agreement, is different, once evaluated by examples like the following: 
14) (¿?) El preso huyó y se mezcló con el gentío; mi hija, con gente poco recomendable. // 
 (¿?) Los alumnos de primero se mezclaron con los de segundo en un aula; mi hija, con los 
 asesinos de su hermano.  
 'The prisoner fled and mixed with the crowd; my daughter, with questionable people. // 
 The first grade students mixed with the second grade ones in a classroom; my daughter 
 with her brother's killers. 
15) *El preso huyó y se mezcló entre el gentío; mi hija, con gente poco recomendable.  
 'The prisoner fled and mixed in with the crowd; my daughter, with questionable people.' 
The surprising impression of 14) comes from the fact that in the second part of the sentences 
the verb mezclar ('mix') is clearly interpreted in the sense of 'having a relationship with', while 
                                                 
26 The agentive character of the sentences with human subjects can make the coordination with clearly non-
agentive subjects difficult. Since a generic restriction, that can function to a greater or lesser extent, is 
involved, it would be good to avoid the examples in which the distance is the greatest: Las hojas de los árboles 
se mezclaron (con, entre) los papeles; los prisioneros, (con, entre) la muchedumbre. 'The leaves of the trees 
got mixed (with, in with) the papers; the prisoners, (with, in with) the crowd.' As we see here, the use of the 
noun monedas (coins) (for the movement it implies) reduces the incompatibility generated by the agentive 
subjects issue and acts very well as a bridge between the two extremes.  
27 It is important to know that, if the preposition of the compound phrases can also provoke interferences, 
according to context, these can be less than those that we have seen above for certain argument objects 
("complementos argumentales") like the direct object in Spanish. See, for example, the difference in 
acceptability between the following sentences: (??) Juan vio un árbol y a María 'John saw a tree and Mary' // 
Juan estuvo en casa y por el parque 'John was at home and in the park'. 
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in the first it has the meaning of 'uniting a person or thing to another person or thing'. Since 
both are rather far apart, a cross-reading is difficult. That would also explain why the change 
of preposition is unacceptable in 15), faced with this occurrence, next, in 16), where only the 
interpretation of the second sentence in the sense of the first makes, even when certain 
syntactical interferences survive, the acceptability a lot greater:  
16) El preso huyó y se mezcló entre el gentío; mi hija, con los manifestantes. 
 'The prisoner fled and mixed in with the crowd; my daughter, with the demonstrators.' 
17) (¿?) El preso huyó y se mezcló [unirse] entre el gentío; mi hija, con los manifestantes 
 [tener relación]. 
 'The prisoner fled and mixed [to unite] in with the crowd; my daughter, with the demon-
 strators [form a relationship with].' 
With respect to the supposed meaning of comprometerse ('to engage in'), despite all the 
dictionaries seeming to agree in considering it a meaning, perhaps for the exclusivity in the 
prepositional use and for the specific lexical selection, it appears to involve, in reality, a 
variant of 'to form a relationship'. For the speakers a broader meaning ('to have a relation-
ship'), that is manifested in two different ways from the syntactic point of view, exists. The 
possibility of coordinating the two prepositions ends up being very relevant in this respect28: 
18) No me mezcles en esos asuntos y menos con esa gente.  
 'Don't get me mixed up in those affairs, no less with those people.' 
19) No solo se había mezclado con los criminales, sino también en el crimen mismo. 
 'Not only had he gotten mixed up with criminals, but also in the crime itself.' 
The meaning 'to link by marriage' is a different case. All the tests indicate that, from the exis-
tence of this use, we find ourselves facing a new meaning:  
20) Mi hijo nunca se mezcló con delincuentes; mi familia tampoco con familias de distinta 
 clase social.  
 'My daughter never mixed with delinquents; nor my family with families of a different 
 social class.' 
Sentence 20 is only acceptable if we interpret the second part in the sense of 'form a relation-
ship' not ' link by marriage'. Also, the impossibility of 21, where mezclar ('mix') is referenced 
with the verb hacer ('do'), proceeds from the fact that the two alternative meanings are not 
natural, that is to say, an interpretation of the verb mezclar in the first segment of the sentence 
with the idea of 'to have a definite link or relationship' and, in the second, with that of 'to link 
by marriage':  
21) (¿?) Hoy esos aristócratas no se mezclan con el pueblo, aunque lo hayan hecho durante 
 generaciones. 
 'Today those aristocrats do not mix with the people, although they have done it for genera-
 tions.' 
                                                 
28 In the CREA we also find the following example: Se negó a comunicar los nombres de sus contactos, si es 
que los conocía, pero juró y perjuró que él jamás se mezclaría en asuntos políticos, y menos con los maquis. 
'He refused to communicate the names of his contacts, assuming he knew them, but he swore and committed 
perjury saying that he never got mixed up in political affairs, no less with the Maquis.' 
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2.2 A new proposal for separating meanings 
Taking into account the analysis above –and without intending to be exhaustive – I will dare 
to regroup the examples from the three dictionaries that were examined in groups more in 
accordance with the real meanings of the verb mezclar.29 
mezclar. 
1. Juntar unas cosas con otras, alterando o sin alterar el 
orden en que se encontraban previamente.  
Variantes sintácticas: mezclar una cosa; mezclar una 
cosa con otra; mezclar una cosa entre otras; mezclar 
una cosa y otra. 
No mezcles el vino, que se estropea.  
Bata los huevos y mézclelos con la harina. El bode-
guero mezclaba vino y agua. El pintor no ha mezclado 
bien los colores. 
No mezcles las fichas porque están por orden alfabé-
tico. 
Ha mezclado los libros de la estantería y ahora no se 
puede encontrar ninguno. 
Deja de tocar mis papeles, los estás mezclando. No me 
mezcles las fotos.  
En su fiesta mezcló a intelectuales y artistas. 
mezclarse: con sentido agentivo o inacusativo. 
Variantes sintácticas: mezclarse con una cosa; mez-
clarse entre varias cosas. 
En el recreo se mezclan los alumnos de varios cursos. 
Se han caído y se han mezclado todos los sellos. 
Nos mezclamos con la muchedumbre en la manifesta-
ción. Se mezcló con la muchedumbre en la manifest-
ación. El cantante se mezcló entre el público para 
pasar desapercibido. 
2. Tener un determinado vínculo o relación. 
Variantes sintácticas: mezclarse en una cosa; mezclar-
se con una persona. 
Me mezclé en su negocio al principio, pero no sabía 
que era ilegal. Deseo que no me mezcléis en vuestra 
discusión. Mezcló a su familia en sus negocios sucios 
y ahora están todos en la cárcel; no te mezcles en este 
asunto si quieres evitarte problemas.  
Es peligroso mezclarse con tipos como esos. Le gusta 
mezclarse con los artistas. Sus padres le prohibieron 
mezclarse con los otros chicos del barrio. 
3. Enlazarse por matrimonio. 
Los aristócratas solo se han mezclado entre sí durante 
generaciones. 
'mix. 
1. To join some things with others, 
altering or without altering the order in 
which it was previously found.  
Syntactical variants: ...' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'mix: in the agentive or unaccusative 
sense. 
Syntactical variants: ...' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'2. To have a definite link or 
relationship. 
Syntactical variants: ...' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'3. To link by marriage. ...' 
 
3 Conclusion 
The present paper shows the importance of having linguistic instruments, principally semantic 
ones, for determining the meaning of words with the greatest precision and, consequently, 
                                                 
29 The definitions appear by way of indicative. They are only intended to be close semantic orientations.  
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managing to meticulously establish the different meanings of a dictionary's key words. Of 
course, linguistics is not an exact science, and I am aware that we will not always be able to 
offer, with the same amount of ease, satisfactory solutions to all the problems that the lexicon 
of a language can present us. The idea that we are cultivating, those of us who are embarked 
upon the great task of making the New Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Language30, 
nevertheless, is that it's possible to find some objective criteria that, besides allowing us to get 
much closer to the mental lexicon of the speaker, contributes to guaranteeing the general 
coherence of these types of works. With all probability, we will not get to deal, in a reliable 
and definitive way, with 100% of the entry words in the macrostructure of our dictionary; but, 
if we can achieve, as we hope, the homogeneous and reliable treatment of at least 80% of 
them, we will have taken an important step in that process of improvement that lexicography 
is constantly undergoing.  
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